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Case No. 20080774-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Julie Ann McKenzie Fairbanks,
Petitioner/ Appellee,
vs.

Peter Nathan Fairbanks,
Respondent/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(h)
(West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court clearly err when it categorized and accounted for the
parties' residential properties?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the correctness of the trial court's
findings of fact for clear error. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides that
"findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses/ ,
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it divided the marital
residential properties using a valuation model other than that advocated by

Appellant Peter Fairbanks?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the trial court's decisions regarding
property division in a divorce proceeding for a "clear abuse of discretion."
Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83117
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it rejected Appellant Peter
Fairbanks's claims of "overt cruel and damaging behaviors of the Wife" as
grounds for divorce?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the trial court's decision on the
grounds for divorce for "abuse of discretion." See Trubetzkoy v. Trubetzkoy, 2009
UT App 77, f 30,

P.2d

(2009) (clearly applying an abuse of discretion

standard to this issue).
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its award of alimony to
Appellee Julie Ann McKenzie Fairbanks? 1
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the trial court's award of alimony
for "clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion." Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, f
7, 76 P.3d 716
5. Is Appellee Julie Ann McKenzie Fairbanks entitled to costs and
1

This issue includes both Appellant's argument regarding "fault"
(Appellant's "issue 2") and his arguments regarding the consideration of his
education, profession, and other issues in the alimony award (Appellant's "issue
3").
2

attorneys fees for defending against a frivolous appeal as defined in Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure 33?
Standard of Review: As this issue does not call on this Court to review a
decision of the lower court, there is no applicable standard of review. Instead,
this Court reviews the nature of Appellant Mr. Fairbanks's appeal under Rule 33
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
The statutes and rules pertinent to this appeal are Utah Code Annotated §
30-3-5(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a), and Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure 24(a)(9) and 33. The text of these provisions is included in the
Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In July 2005, Julie Ann McKenzie Fairbanks (hereinafter Ms. Julie
Fairbanks) filed a petition for divorce. Pre-trial hearings were held in January
and March 2006. The couple attended mediation in both April and November
2007. A Final Pre-Trial Order was issued by the court on January 31, 2008. (R.
97.) That Order included a long list of undisputed claims and issues, including a
statement t h a t " during the course of the marriage, irreconcilable differences have
arisen between the parties causing the irreparable breakdown of the marriage
and as a consequence thereof continuation of the marriage was no longer viable/ 7
3

(R. 94.) Trial was held in the Fourth District Court before Judge Samuel McVey
on May 8, 2008. At trial, the parties' stipulation to the division of the majority of
the couple's marital property was accepted by the court accepted, which it
incorporated by reference into the Decree of Divorce. (Findings of Fact f 6).
At the conclusion of the trial, the court presented its findings of facts and
conclusions of law. Those relevant to this appeal include findings regarding the
division of the martial homes, the award of alimony, and the grounds for the
divorce.
First, the court concluded that Ms. Julie Fairbanks elected to invest $50,000
of her separate property inheritance into the Orem home. (Findings of Fact Tf 11;
Conclusions of Law | 2). In assessing the division of the marital property in the
two homes, the court concluded that Ms. Julie Fairbanks had invested $50,000 of
her separate property into the Orem home, in a way that was "easily traceable."
(Conclusions of Law ^ 2). The court further notes that the parties had together
transferred $31,315.54 of marital property equity from the Washington home into
the Orem home; half of which was attributed to each party. Thus, of the
$160,403.29 equity, Ms. Julie Fairbanks was credited with $50,000 and her half of
the $31,315.54 (or $15,657.77). (Conclusions of Law | 2). Peter Fairbanks was
credited with $15,657.77. (Conclusions of Law | 2). The remaining equity,

4

$79,087.75, was divided equally. (Conclusions of Law ^f 2). The Court further
concluded that while Peter Fairbanks had paid the mortgage on the Orem home,
this was akin to "temporary alimony payments" and the "mortgage [was] low
enough that it appromixate[d] what rent would [have been] if wife leased a
house," and that, in fact, it was "substantially lower" because of the additional
money Ms. Julie Fairbanks had contributed from her inheritance. (Conclusions
of Law 12).
Second, the court awarded alimony to Ms. Julie Fairbanks in the amount of
$2,271 per month, subject to adjustment in Fall 2009 after she receives her
teaching certification. (Conclusions of Law f 8). The court's award was based
on a thorough analysis of her current monthly expenses, her ability to support
herself, her husband's ability to pay support, and the length of the marriage.
(Conclusions of Law | 7). The court noted that at trial Peter Fairbanks "raised
fault... as a consideration for reducing alimony." (Conclusions of Law | 8).
With regard to such arguments, the court concluded that while it believed that
"wife significantly contributed to the divorce occurring, she did not engage in
the activities the legislature primarily had in mind when enacting the fault
factor." (Conclusions of Law f 8).

5

Finally, the Court granted the couple's divorce on grounds of
"irreconcilable differences/' (Decree of Divorce *[[ 1).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Peter and Julie Ann McKenzie Fairbanks (hereinafter Mr. Fairbanks and
Ms. Julie Fairbanks) were originally married from June 28,1975 until September
1987. The couple remarried in July 1990 in Payson, Utah. They have four adult
children. During the later years of their marriage, the couple resided in a home
in Lake Stevens, Washington, which they owned together.
On August 8, 2002, Ms. Julie Fairbanks, with the knowledge and
agreement of her husband, relocated to Utah, in part to help care for her ill
mother and also to attend school at Brigham Young University. (See Trial
Transcript page 16.) Together the couple purchased a home in Orem, Utah, for
which they paid the mortgage together. (See Trial Transcript page 17.) The
parties refinanced their Washington home and used $31,000 of equity from that
home toward the purchase of the Orem home. (See Trial Transcript page 58).
Ms. Julie Fairbanks resided in that home until the time of the couple's divorce in
May, 2008.
In July 2003, Ms. Julie Fairbanks received an inheritance. She elected to
invest $50,000 of that inheritance into the Orem home. (Findings of Fact f 11).
6

On January 28, 2005, Ms. Julie Fairbanks filed for divorce, alleging that
during the course of the marriage, irreconcilable difference arose between the
parties causing the irreparable breakdown of the marriage, and as a consequence
thereof, the continuation of the marriage was no longer viable.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: This Court should affirm Judge McVey's Findings of Fact because
(1) Mr. Fairbanks failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings, and (2) Judge McVey's findings are supported by the record.
Point II: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it chose and
applied a valuation method for the parties' residential property.
Point III: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected
Appellant Peter Fairbanks's claims of "overt cruel and damaging behaviors of
the Wife" as grounds for divorce.
Point IV: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it calculated an
award of alimony for Ms. Julie Fairbanks.
Point V: This Court should award attorney fees to Ms. Julie Fairbanks for
defending against this frivolous appeal.
ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions
of law as such were clearly within the court's discretion and supported by
7

evidence presented at trial. Further, the Court should award fees and costs to
Appellee Ms. Julie Fairbanks for having to spend the time and money needed to
defend against this frivolous appeal.
I.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURTS
CATEGORIZATION AND ACCOUNTING FOR THE PARTIES7
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES.
This Court should uphold the trial court's factual findings in this case for

two reasons. First, because Mr. Fairbanks did not marshal the evidence in
support of the findings he challenges. Second, because even if he had marshaled
the evidence supporting the court's findings, there was sufficient evidence to
support the trial court's categorization and accounting for the parties' residential
property.
A. This Court should reject Mr. Fairbanks's allegations of factual
error because he did not marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings.
Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a "party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports
the challenged finding." In order to properly challenge factual findings such as
these, the challenging party is required to marshal "'all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light
of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by

8

substantial evidence/" Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, \ 17,164
P.3d 384 {quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Common, 776 P.2d
63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Thus, to fully comply with the requirement, the
challenging party must "marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an
attack." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, Tfll, 999 P.2d 1252 (internal quotations
and citation omitted). Perhaps the best explanation of the marshaling
requirement came from the Utah Court of Appeals itself when it stated:
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate.
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and
fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge
the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the
appellate court that the court's findings resting upon the evidence is
clearly erroneous.
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(emphasis in original).
One key purpose of the marshaling requirement is to "remind [] litigants
and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial." State
v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Further, the marshaling
9

requirement is designed to ensure that the court is able to meaningfully review
the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the court below relied and overturn
only those factual determinations that lack the support of substantial evidence.
See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT at 117. As one commentator
noted, the marshaling requirement, which forces an appellant to "catalogue the
evidence supporting the trial court's decision/' insures that appellants do not
merely "try to persuade the appellate court that their theory of the case was
stronger than that which was advanced by the other side, or that their evidence
and witnesses were more compelling/' but rather it insures that "appellate
review of a factual determination is strictly confined to an analysis of whether
there was sufficient evidence to support the particular factual conclusion that
was actually reached below." Ryan D. Tenney, The Utah Marshaling Requirement:
An Overview, Utah B. J. 22 (August/September 2004).
Utah courts have imposed the marshaling requirements on pro se
appellants. See Thomas v. Department of Workforce Services, 2008 UT App 361 % 1
(unreported). Addressing whether a pro se litigant must satisfy the marshaling
requirement, this Court opined that "while 'this court generally is lenient with
pro se litigants/ such parties must still comply with our rules." Blosch v. Blosch,
2005 UT App 28111 (unreported) (quoting Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11,^ 4); see
also Maisbitt v. Fink, 1999 UT App 129 f 3 (unreported).
10

Utah's appellate courts have historically accepted the lower court's
findings when the appellant fails to comply with the marshaling requirement.
See, e.g., State v. Earl, 2004 UT App 163, | 1 1 , 92 P.3d 167. In Martinez v. MediaPaymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, 1116-21,164 P.2d 384, the Utah Supreme Court held
that while automatic affirmation may not be required in all cases, it is still a
permissible sanction for a party who fails to properly marshal the evidence.
That sanction is appropriate here. This is not a case where an appellant
largely complied with the marshaling requirement but then inadvertently
omitted a few peripheral details. Rather, this is a case in which the party
challenging the court's factual findings completely failed to marshal any
evidence and instead merely provides the court with a restatement of his
unsuccessful arguments from trial.
Given Mr. Fairbanks's multiple marshaling failures, this Court should
decline to address the merits of his sufficiency challenge.
B. Even if this Court addresses Mr. Fairbanks's sufficiency challenge
on its merits, this Court should still hold that there was sufficient
evidence to support the trial court's findings.
Even if the Court determines that Mr. Fairbanks's brief meets the lower
level of marshaling required for pro se litigants, the Court should still affirm the
trial court's findings of fact because sufficient evidence was presented to
overcome a challenge of clear error. A finding of fact is only "clearly erroneous''
11

when it is "so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence/7 State ex rel. E. R., 2001 UT App 66,1 5, 21 P.3d 680.
There is sufficient evidence on the Record supporting the trial court's
categorization and accounting for the parties' residential properties to overcome
a challenge of "clear error."
First, there is sufficient evidence on the Record to support the trial court's
conclusion that Ms. Julie Fairbanks was entitled to a $50,000 credit in the Or em
home reflecting her investment of separate inheritance money into that property.
In her testimony, Ms. Julie Fairbanks testified that she received $100,000
inheritance after the death of her mother in 2003. (See Trial Transcript page 28.)
Mr. Fairbanks testified that Ms. Julie Fairbanks invested $50,000 of that
inheritance into the mortgage of the Orem house. (See Trial Transcript page 60.)
When asked if Ms. Julie Fairbanks should receive credit for that $50,000, which
she placed in the Orem home, Mr. Fairbanks opined that "it would depend on
the assessment on it, [whether it was] a legal mixing of marital assets." (See Trial
Transcript p. 67.) The trial court did not clearly err when it decided that Ms. Julie
Fairbanks's inheritance was separate property for which she was entitled to a
credit.
Second, although Mr. Fairbanks argues in his appeal that he also
contributed "traceable" separate property to the two homes, there is sufficient
12

evidence on the Record to support the trial court's conclusion that those
investments were either marital property or insufficiently traceable to constitute
separate property. The only evidence on the Record regarding any arguably
separate property invested by Mr. Fairbanks involves his own opinion that postseparation funds should be deemed separate rather than marital property. The
only specific mention of such arguably separate funds is found when Mr.
Fairbanks testified that he had refinanced the mortgage on the Washington home
and paid "additional funds" in order to secure a lower interest rate on the loan.
(See Trial Transcript page 66.) However, he failed to show that the money
invested was not marital property, nor did he show that he invested any
traceably separate funds into the home. He simply argues that any equity earned
in the home since Ms. Julie Fairbanks's move to Utah in August 2002 should be
attributed to him as "separate" rather than "marital" property. Nothing in the
Record shows that the trial court committed clear error in rejecting such an
argument.
Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's factual findings with
regard to the categorization and accounting for the parties' residential properties.

13

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DIVIDED THE MARITAL RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES USING A
VALUATION MODEL OTHER THAN THAT ADVOCATED BY
APPELLANT PETER FAIRBANKS.
In addition to rejecting Mr. Fairbanks's claim that the trial court's findings

of facts are in error, this Court should affirm the trial court's decision regarding
the division and valuation of marital properties in this case because the trial
court's choice of valuation models did not show a clear abuse of discretion.
As this Court has aptly stated, " A trial court has considerable discretion
concerning property [division] in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a
presumption of validity." Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994). An appellate court will only disturb a trial court's property division
and valuation "when there is 'a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion/ " Id. (quoting Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369,1373 (Utah
1988)).

Likewise, "[i]n divorce actions, the trial court has considerable

discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and [the
appellate court] will not disturb its decision unless it is clearly unjust or a clear
abuse of discretion/ 7 Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149,1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
In March 2009, this Court reinforced its position regarding the trial court's

14

discretion in such issues when it stated:
"Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining . . .
property distribution in divorce cases, and [their decisions] will be
upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is
demonstrated." Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, | 8,176
P.3d 476 (omission in original) (quoting Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d
1209,1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). Indeed, the trial court's discretion
is so broad "that its actions enjoy a presumption of validity/7 Elman
v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, f 17, 45 P.3d 176 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Trubetzkoy v. Trubektzkoy, 2009 UT App 77,1 8, _ P.2d _ (2009).
The fact that a distribution is not "equal" numerically does not make it
presumptively invalid. As this Court stated,
An equitable distribution of marital property does not require strict
mathematical equality. See Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106,107 (Utah
1986). In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has affirmed a marital
property distribution with the same ratio as in this case, 56% and
44%. See Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406,408 (Utah 1983) (per
curiam) (rejecting the husband's challenge where he received 56% of
the assets).
Trubetzkoy v. Trubektzkoy, 2009 UT App 77, | 24, _ P.2d _ (2009).
Mr. Fairbanks points to the case of Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 464,470-471
(Utah 1984), to support his argument that the trial court abused its discretion in
choosing a different valuation model from that which he advocated. However,
the court in Argyle, which was examining a much more difficult valuation
problem involving jointly held stock, upheld the trial court's valuation finding
that while its method differed from that advanced by the complaining party, it
15

was a "reasonable and fair valuation" and did not evidence an abuse of
discretion. Id. at 471.
Mr. Fairbanks asserts that the valuation method employed by the trial
court was faulty because it did not calculate the residential properties in the way
that he would have, but he fails to show that the method employed reflected a
"misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error." Nor has he shown that "the evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings." Ultimately, he has failed to demonstrate that the method
employed by the trial court resulted in "such a serious inequity . . . as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion." Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial court's
decision.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
REJECTED APPELLANT PETER FAIRBANKS'S CLAIMS OF "OVERT
CRUEL AND DAMAGING BEHAVIORS OF THE WIFE" AS GROUNDS
FOR DIVORCE.
This Court should uphold the trial court's decision to decide the parties'

divorce on grounds other than those forwarded by Appellant Peter Fairbanks.
This Court should not review the lower court's grounds for granting the parties'
divorce unless the Appellant is able to provide authority for such review. Mr.
Fairbanks has not done so.
In a case decided by this Court in March 2009, the appealing party

16

similarly petitioned the court to modify the grounds of divorce from
"irreconcilable differences" to the fault-based ground of adultery. Trubetzkoy v.
Trubektzkoy, 2009 UT App 77f f 30, _ P.2d _ (2009). In refusing to do so, this
Court noted that in that case the wife "simply prefer[ed]that the divorce be
granted due to adultery instead," and concluded that there was "nothing in the
governing statute" and no other authority "that would require the trial court to
adopt one ground for divorce over another." Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1
(2007)). Therefore, this Court declined to order the trial court to substitute the
basis of the divorce. Id.
This case is directly analogous to the Trubektzkoy decision. Appellant Peter
Fairbanks has presented this Court with no authority for substituting its
judgment regarding the proper grounds for this divorce for the judgment of the
trial court. Mr. Fairbanks may believe that he was entitled to a divorce based on
the grounds of desertion, neglect, and cruel behavior on the part of his former
wife. In fact, he admits that he made such arguments at trial. See Appellant's Brief
p. 38. The trial court, having heard both evidence and argument from Mr.
Fairbanks and his trial counsel, declined to base the parties' divorce on such
grounds. Nothing in the Record nor in Mr. Fairbanks's brief shows evidence that
the trial court abused its discretion in so finding, and therefore, this Court should
reject Mr. Fairbanks's plea and affirm the trial court's conclusion.
17

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS AWARD
OF ALIMONY TO MS. JULIE FAIRBANKS.
This Court should affirm the trial court's award of alimony because such

award does not show a "clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion."
Utah law clearly upholds the broad discretion of trial courts in
determining awards of alimony. According to this Court, "'Trial courts have
considerable discretion in determining alimony ... and [determinations of
alimony] will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion is demonstrated/" Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, f 7, 76 P.3d 716
(alterations in original) (quoting Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah
Ct. App.1995)). Thus, as a general rule, trial courts have wide discretion in
awarding alimony, and an appellate court will disturb such an award only when
the trial court exceeds its discretion. See Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App
357, \ 7, 80 P.3d 153.
Trial courts have broad discretion in making alimony awards so long as
they consider at least the following factors:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;

18

(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring
support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated
by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in
the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)-(vii) (Supp.2008).
In addition to the statutory factors, the trial court is obliged to consider the
three primary purposes of alimony awards: "(1) to get the parties as close as
possible to the same standard of living that existed during the marriage; (2) to
equalize the standards of living of each party; and (3) to prevent the recipient
spouse from becoming a public charge." Richardson v. Richardson, 2008 UT 57, | 7.
When a trial court's decision has considered these statutory and intent factors,
this Court should only disturb its alimony award if there is '"a serious inequity . .
. manifesting] a clear abuse of discretion/" Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, \
26, 9 P.3d 171 (quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct.App.1998).
While Mr. Fairbanks argues that there were factors that he believes should
have made a significant difference in the alimony awarded by the trial court, he
fails to show that the trial court either ignored any of the statutory or intent
19

factors or that the court's decision resulted in a "serious inequity . . . manifesting
a clear abuse of discretion."
First, Mr. Fairbanks's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to consider "fault" when determining Ms. Julie Fairbanks's alimony
award fails because the court did, in fact, consider potential fault when making
its decision. In its Conclusion of Law the trial court noted Mr. Fairbanks's
arguments regarding fault and its conclusion that Ms. Julie Fairbanks "did not
engage in the activities the legislature primarily had in mind when enacting the
fault factor." (Conclusions of Law f 7 citing Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5).
In addition to his arguments regarding the "fault" factors in the trial
court's alimony award, Mr. Fairbanks argues that the trial court further erred in
its award of alimony for Ms. Julie Fairbanks because it considered what he
claims were "impertinent issues" and "untimely claims." Despite Mr.
Fairbanks's assertion that such conclusions are subject to de novo review, as part
of the alimony award they are subject to the trial court's discretion. See Davis v.
Davis, 2003 UT App 282,1 7, 76 P.3d 716
Whether the trial court did consider Ms. Julie Fairbanks's support of her
husband during his schooling or other obligations Mr. Fairbanks refutes is
unclear from the court's findings and conclusions, but regardless of whether it
did or did not consider such things, this would be within the court's broad
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discretion in determining the alimony award in the case. Mr. Fairbanks has
failed to show that the decision reached represented an abuse of the trial court's
discretion, and therefore, that decision should be affirmed.
Because the trial court did consider all aspects of the case when
determining the alimony award and did not abuse its discretion in so doing, this
Court should find that the trial court's award of alimony fell within its broad
discretion and affirm that award.
V.

THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES TO MS. JULIE
FAIRBANKS BECAUSE HER HUSBAND'S APPEAL WAS FRIVOLOUS
UNDER UTAH RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 33.
Under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9), "a party seeking to

recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and
set forth the legal basis for such an award/'
This Court should award attorney's fees and costs to Ms. Julie Fairbanks as
Mr. Fairbanks's appeal falls under the definition of "frivolous" found in Utah
Rule of Appellate Procedure 33. Under Rule 33, if the Court "determines that a
motion made or appeal taken under these rules is . . . frivolous . . ., it shall award
just damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party."
Rule 33 further defines a "frivolous" appeal as one that is "not grounded
in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to
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extend, modify, or reverse existing law/7 Although Utah courts may hesitate
awarding fees for frivolous appeals, they have clearly concluded that an award
of attorney's fees is proper when "an appeal is obviously without any merit and
has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and results in . . .
increased costs of litigation; and dissipation of the time and resources of the Law
Court." Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), quoting Auburn
Harpswell Ass]n v. Day, 438 A.2d 234, 239 (Me. 1981).
Mr. Fairbanks's appeal satisfies the definition of "frivolous." It is
completely without merit as it contains no arguments upon which the lower
court's decision could be reversed. The arguments therein boil down to nothing
more than "I don't like the decision below, so it should be reversed."
Clearly Mr. Fairbanks feels hurt and personally slighted by the dissolution
of his marriage for a second time, particularly in light of his obviously intense
personal objection to divorce. This, however, does not make his appeal
meritorious. At the end of the day, Mr. Fairbanks's brief does not argue any
specific error in the trial court's findings of fact except that the trial court did not
interpret the facts in the same way that he does. Further, his brief does not set
out any valid legal arguments under which this Court could reverse the lower
court's findings and conclusions. Thus, Mr. Fairbanks's appeal is frivolous in
that it is neither "grounded in fact" nor "warranted by existing law." Mr.
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Fairbanks's appeal is also frivolous because it was taken with "no reasonable
likelihood of prevailing/' especially as he has failed to marshal any facts
supporting the factual findings he challenges, and his inability to support his
allegations of the court's alleged abuse of discretion with anything more than his
own opinions. Finally, Mr. Fairbanks's appeal is frivolous because it has clearly
"resulted] in .. . increased costs of litigation; and dissipation of the time and
resources of the Law Court." For these reasons, this Court should award Ms.
Julie Fairbanks both costs and attorney's fees in defending against this frivolous
appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the Decree of Divorce
issued by the lower court and award attorney's fees and costs to Ms. Julie
Fairbanks for having to defend against this frivolous appeal.
Respectfully submitted April 2? 2009.

KRISTIN B. GERDY

Counsel for Appellee
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (Supp. 2008)
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring
support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by
the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing
at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection
(8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that
existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard
of living that existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both,
that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the
court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and
awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and
no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may
consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the
marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and
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new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was
entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the
payor may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share
living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court
finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of
years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of
alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of
alimony for a longer period of time.
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)
Rule 52. Findings by the court.

(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of
law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58 A; in granting or
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings
of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action.
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court.
It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally
and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as
provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and
(b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground.

A-3

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9)
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state
the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
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Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees.
a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a
criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which
may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, a n d / o r reasonable
attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be
paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief,
or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law,
or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.
An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is
one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing
the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or
upon its own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part
of the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the
appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the
court shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall
set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least
ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown.
The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded,
the court shall grant a hearing.
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